Online Appendix:

Tied to the Land? Intergenerational Mobility and Agrarian Reform in Colombia

Contents

Appendix A Data Construction

A.1 Agrarian Reform Data

This section explains in detail the sources and construction of agrarian reform data. As discussed in section 3.1, this study uses micro-level historical information constructed from the archives of the extinguished Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (or INCORA), which are currently managed by the National Land Agency (ANT) at Bogotá, Colombia. Specifically, I draw upon three archival series: expropiation files from the *Sharecroppers and Tenants Program*, land titles records issued by INCORA - which include state-owned lands (or *baldios*), parcels and other types of transactions - and notarial records from the National Registry of Civil Status (RNEC) in 1966-1972. The archives are protected under Colombian privacy laws that prohibit the publication and use of personal information (Laws 1581 of 2012, 1712 of 2014, 79 of 1993, and Decree 1743 of 2016). Consequently, the data is accessed through confidentiality agreements.

Each expropiation file included the following information: legal documents (INCORA and judicial decisions, notarial records, etc.), technical studies made by INCORA officials (*informe de visita*) and, if the expropiation took place, applicant surveys (*formulario de aplicación*). Each land title contains the name, ID number, date, location and area titled. As explained in section 2, only 10% of expropiations files were successfull. However, of these, I only found that 218 effectively included systematic. I use all data sources to collect information about applicants: full name, ID number (or *cédula de ciudadania*), address, household members, occupation, working experience, wages, assets, housing, types of crops grown and whether it allocated a parcel or not. The scores assigned by INCORA were reported in numerous files also. Research assistants helped to tabulate this information and construct a database.

Based on INCORA Directive 23 of 1966, I reconstructed the scores employed in the empirical strategy. The evaluation for each applicant was made along 4 key topics: family age characteristics, agricultural experience, assets and housing investments according to the scoring system described in Table 1. Summing across all attributes, I calculated a predicted INCORA score for each applicant family. Next, for each expropiation file e I defined its score threshold s_e as the minimum score needed to be allocated land based on the number of parcels (AFUs) available. To make applicants comparable, I rescaled each threshold to zero by defining the distance between an applicant's score s_i and its respective score cutoff s_e as $dists_e = s_i - s_e$. Following this set up, applicants with scores above (or on) zero would be eligible to become recipients, while those below would not. I used this variable to implement th RD design in the empirical strategy in section 4.

In the following tables and figures, I list the variables coded from expropiation files and show photographs of them. Figures A.1 shows a photograph from an expropiation file, indicating the *Sharecroppers and Tenants Program* series, location and date. Figure A.2 shows another photograph from the INCORA visit report (*informe de visita*). Finally, Figure A.3 shows photograph from an INCORA survey (*formulario de aplicación*). Names and ID numbers have been erased to comply with privacy laws.

Table A.1: Agrarian Reform Data

Variable	Description	Type	Source
Agricultural Experience	Years	Integers	INCORA
Log(Wages)	Colombian pesos in 1968-1970	Continuous	INCORA
Has House	1=has house, 0=otherwise	Dummy	INCORA
Plot Area	Hectares	Continuous	INCORA
Grows Cash Crops	1=grows cash crops, 0=otherwise	Dummy	INCORA
Grows Staple Crops	1=grows staple crops, 0=otherwise	Dummy	INCORA

Figure A.1: Expropiation File

Nº29845

No. [redacted]

REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA

incora

CLASE DE ACTUACION ADQUISICIONES

INTERESADOS [redacted]

NOMBRE DEL PREDIO [redacted]

MUNICIPIO OVEJAS CORREGIMIENTO

DEPARTAMENTO SUCRE

INTENDENCIA

COMISARIA

RADICADO

LIBRO I TOMO I FOLIO [redacted]

BOGOTA, SINCELEJO, MAYO 8 - 1969

Figure A.2: INCORA Technical Studies

INFORME DE VISITA

EXPEDIENTE No.

DEPARTAMENTO: CORDOBA

MUNICIPIO: PUEBLO NUEVO

CASERIO:

NOMBRE DE LA FINCA:

NOMBRE DEL PROPIETARIO:

DISTRITO:

VISITADOR:

FECHA: Noviembre 8 de 1.968.

I -DILIGENCIA

En la fecha veinte y cinco de Octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho dando cumplimiento al auto de fecha veinte y tres de Octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho, el suscrito funcionario del INSTITUTO COLOMBIANO DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA-INCORA, se trasladó al predio denominado " ", ubicado en el caserío , jurisdicción del Municipio de Pueblo Nuevo Departamento de Córdoba a objeto de adelantar en unión del señor en calidad de ADMINISTRADOR, la diligencia de visita ordenada conforme a lo dispuesto por el numeral 3o. del Artículo 22 del Decreto 719 de 1.968. Una vez en el terreno se procedió a recorrerlo en su totalidad encontrandolo en las condiciones que a continuación se consignan.

El acta correspondiente de la visita se adjunta al expediente respectivo, debidamente firmada.

Figure A.3: Applicant Survey



aparcero del predio

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FORMULARIO DE INSCRIPCION

1) Fecha y Lugar de Recepción Sep-11 San Bernardo
2) Ficha
3) Puntaje 107
4) Encuestador
5) Municipio o Corregimiento San Bernardo
6) Vereda Pedernal
7) Finca(s) o Predio La Garrega

8. JEFE DE LA FAMILIA

a) Nombre
b) C.C. ó T.I.
c) Lugar y fecha de Nacimiento
d) Isidoro Vinculado a la(s) finca(s) SI
e) Trabajador Agropecuario de la Zona del Proyecto NO
f) Propietario Minifundista de la Zona del Proyecto NO

9) SOLICITANTE Y PERSONAS A SU CARGO	10) RELACION CON EL JEFE Y ESTADO CIVIL	11) EDAD (Años)	12) SABE LEER Y ESCRIBIR SI	NO	13) AÑOS DE ESCUELA	14) OCUPACION PRINCIPAL ACTUAL	HABITUAL	15) CAPACIDAD PARA TRABAJAR LA TIERRA
	Casado	75	Si		3 PP: 70	Aquicultor →		R.
	Casada (esposa)	54			7 PO: 20	Oficios Domesticos		—
	Casada Hija	28	Si		10 PM: 2	ofica domestica		—
	Soltero Hijo	21	Si		15 PP: 10			
	Soltero Hijo	18	Si		15 —			
	Soltera Hija	25	Si		10 —			
	Sol. Hijo	12	Si		10 —			

16) OBSERVACIONES

El Isidoro es aparcero de la finca La garrega.

Intera Multilink 190.66 Forma 2 - 77



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b) ARRENDATARIO

Fecha del Contrato	Finca o Hacienda - Propietario	Area	Municipio	Vereda	Clase de Cultivo
X			San Bernardo	Pedernal	

c) APARCERO

d) OTRAS FORMAS - Similares al arrendamiento o aparcería

Tiempo de Vinculo				

e) JORNALERO

	Municipio	Vereda

26) OBSERVACIONES

27) Tiempo de Vinculación
a) A la Finca 40 años
b) A la Zona del Proyecto

28) PATRIMONIO

ACTIVO a - Fuera de la Finca o Hacienda

BIENES	CLASE	NUMERO	VALOR	TOTAL
Inmuebles				
Muebles o Enseres				
Semovientes				
Aves				
Maquinaria				
Capital				
Otros	Mejoras Hacienda "San Luis"		10.000 =	
		Sub - Total	$ 1000	$ 11.600 =

b) Mejoras de la Finca o Hacienda

PASIVO

ACREEDOR	DESTINACION	VALOR	
		1200	
			$ 1200
		PATRIMONIO LIQUIDO	$ 10.400

Forma 2 - 77 (Cont.)

A.2 Linkage of Applicants and Children

In this section, I provide evidence that the subsample of children is balanced across recipient and non-recipients families. If this was not the case, then intergenerational effects of providing land could be biased. Table A.2 documents correlations between the probability of finding the children of applicants in notarial records, the treatment variable (*Recipient*) and other relevant pre-treatment applicant characteristics. As can be seen, in general, these variables are not correlated with each other. Importantly, though, applicants who lived closer to urban centers were more likely to register their children at notaries. Overall, these results validate the use of the subsample of children in the empirical exercises in section 4.

Table A.2: Correlations of Subsample of Children

	RD	
	Coefficient	Standard Error
	(1)	(2)
Recipient	-0.0239	(0.0365)
Score	-0.000565	(0.00121)
Age	-0.00689	(0.0183)
Years of Schooling	0.0245	(0.0185)
Years of Agricultural Experience	-0.000449	(0.00119)
Log(Wages)	-0.00669	(0.00915)
Has House	-0.0487	(0.0590)
Plot Area	-0.00282	(0.00184)
Cash Crops	-0.00261	(0.00278)
Staple Crops	-0.00197	(0.0478)
Distance to Urban Center (in km)	-0.00337***	(0.00118)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each cell in Column (1) in this table reports the coefficient from a RD regression following Calonico et al (2017) of a pre-treatment applicant characteristic in 1968-1970 on the likelihood of finding a child in notarial records, with standard errors in parentheses in Column (2).

A.3 Administrative Data Linkage Algorithm

The linkage of agrarian reform data with comtemporary outcome information follows a simple phonetic algorithm involving the names and ID numbers of applicants and children. In Colombia, as in most spanish speaking countries, a person has two legal last names: the first last name is inherited from the father and the second last name is inherited from the mother. A person can have more than one first name, with two first names being a popular

combination. Moreover, names and last names can often be mispelled, which is why an error term in the linkage process is introduced. Government agencies indicated to match first on ID number and then on a combination of the 4 name variables. Therefore, the algorithm is designed to match ID numbers and full names (two first names and two last names) based on phonetic coincidence along 16 criteria in descending order of importance.

1. 100% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, two first names and two last names.
2. 100% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, concatenate all first names and last names.
3. 100% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, concatenate all last names and first names.
4. 100% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, first names and first last name in agrarian reform data with at least one last name in outcome data.
5. 100% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, first names and second last name in agrarian reform data with at least one last name in outcome data.
6. 95% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, two first names and two last names.
7. 95% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, one first name and two last names (in absense of middle name in agrarian reform data).
8. 95% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, one first name and two last names (in absense of middle name in outcome data).
9. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, two first names (second first name at 90%) and first last name.
10. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, two first names at 90% and two last names.
11. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, two first names and two last names at 90%.
12. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, one of two first names at 90% and one of two last names at 90%.
13. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, first names in outcome data match last names in agrarian reform data and vice-versa.

14. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, first first name in agrarian reform data with one of the two first names in outcome data and two last names.

15. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, second first name in agrarian reform data with one of the two first names in outcome data and two last names.

16. 90% phonetic coincidence. Matches ID number, second first name in agrarian reform data with one of the two first names in outcome data and two last names.

A.4 Contemporary Administrative Data

A.4.1 Sources and Description

As in the case of agrarian records, personal information in administrative data is also protected by privacy laws. Therefore, the outcome data that is legally safeguarded is accessed through confidentiality agreements with: National Planning Department, Ministry of Health and Social Protection, National Registry of Civil Status and Universidad de los Andes. All agreements guarantee the data is employed for academic research but prohibit personal information sharing, disclosure, or usage, in partial or full. A minority of the outcome data (RUES, etc.) used is publicly available at different government websites and web scapred. Next, I describe in detail the outcome data sources and construction of the various administrative data used in the paper.

Table A.3: Outcome Data

Variable	Description	Type	Date	Source
Wealth Index	1-10 score	Continuous	2006	*SISBEN*
Household Index	1-10 score	Continuous	2006	*SISBEN*
Assets Index	1-10 score	Continuous	2006	*SISBEN*
Electricity	1=has electricity, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Sewage	1=has sewage, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Aqueduct	1=has aqueduct, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Running Water	1=has running water, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Gas	1=has gas, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Alive	1=alive in 2010, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF-Estadísticas Vitales*
Registers for Poverty Subsidies	1=found in *SISBEN*, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF*
Above Minimum Wages	1=wage>minimum wage, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*PILA*
Works	1=works, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF*
Works in Formal Sector	1=is in contributory regime, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF & PILA*
Contributes to Social Security	1=contributions>0, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*PILA*
Has Bank Account	1=has bank account, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*SuperFinanciera*
Has Credit Card	1=has credit card, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*SuperFinanciera*
Has Loan	1=has loan, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*SuperFinanciera*
Agriculture	1=works in sectors CIIU Rev 4: A, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF-Afiliaciones Salud & PILA*
Manufacturing	1=works in sectors CIIU Rev 4: C, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF-Afiliaciones Salud & PILA*
Services	1=works in sectors code CIIU Rev 4: H-S, , 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF-Afiliaciones Salud & PILA*
Entrepreneurship	1=has mercantile register, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2005-2018	*RUES*
Migration	1=if migrated, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF*
Urban Migration	1=if migrated to city>300 thousand inhab., 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF*
Rural Migration	1=if migrated to places<25 thousand inhab., 0=otherwise	Dummy	2010	*RUAF*
Years of Schooling	Years	Integers	2006	*SISBEN*
Primary School	1=finished primary school, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
High School	1=finished high school, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Technical Education	1=finished technical education, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
College	1=finished college, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Attending School	1=finished attending school, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Child Labor	1=is child works, 0=otherwise	Dummy	2006	*SISBEN*
Violent Death	1=death is homicide-massacre, 0=otherwise	Dummy	Death year	*RUAF-Estadísticas Vitales*
Displaced	1=appears in RUPTA, 0=otherwise	Dummy	1980-2010	*RUPTA*
Criminal Record	1=has criminal record at Procuraduria, 0=otherwise	Dummy	1980-2018	*Procuraduria*

A.4.2 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

To calculate wealth, housing and asset indices with the SISBEN data, I use standard principal component analysis. This statistical procedure uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated variables into a new system such that the greatest variance by some projection of the data comes to lie on the first coordinate (called the first principal component), the second greatest variance on the second coordinate, and so on (see Jolliffe, 2002). Consider a data matrix, X, with column-wise zero empirical mean (the sample mean of each column has been shifted to zero), where each of the n rows represents a different repetition of the experiment, and each of the p columns gives a particular kind of feature (say, the results from a particular sensor). Mathematically, the transformation is defined by a set of p-dimensional vectors of weights $w_k = (w_1, ..., w_p)_{(k)}$ that map each row vector X_i of X to a new vector of principal component scores $t_i = (t_1, ..., t(_l)_{(i)}$ given by:

$$t_{k(i)} = x_i w_k \tag{1}$$

In such a way that the individual variables t of t considered over the data set successively inherit the maximum possible variance from x, with each loading vector w constrained to be a unit vector. In order to maximize variance, the first loading vector w_1 satisfies:

$$w_1 = argmax \frac{w^T X^T X w}{w^T w} \tag{2}$$

The quantity to be maximised can be recognised as a Rayleigh quotient. A standard result for a positive semidefinite matrix such as XTX is that the quotient's maximum possible value is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix, which occurs when w is the corresponding eigenvector. With w_1 found, the first principal component of a data vector x_i can then be given as a score $t_{1(i)} = x_i w_1$ in the transformed co-ordinates. Table A.4 presents the variables used to calculate the wealth index using principal component analysis.

Table A.4: Wealth Index Composition

Variable	Description	Type
Housing type	1=house or apartment, 2=room, 3=other	Integers
Risk	1=high, 2=regular, 3=low	Integers
Walls	1=block, brick, stone, polished wood 2=clay, 3=wattle and daub 4=prefabricated material 5=coarse wood, plank 6=bamboo, cane, mat, other vegetable 7=zinc, cloth, cannon, cans, waste, plastics 0=without walls	Integers
Floor	1=carpet or rug, marble, marque, polished wood 2=tile, vinyl, tablet or brick 3=cement, gravel 4=rough or shabby wood plank 5=dust, sand	Integers
Rooms	Number of rooms	Continuous
Kitchen	1=has kitchen, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Bathrooms	Number of bathrooms	Continuous
Toilet	1=toilet connected to aqueduct 2=toilet connected to septic tank 3=toilet not connected 4=latrine 0=no toilet	Integers
Shower	1=has shower, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Trash	1=has trash disposal, 0=otherwise	Integers
Fridge	1=has fridge, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Washing machine	1=has washing machine, 0=otherwise	Dummy
TV	1=has TV, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Cable TV	1=has cable TV, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Telephone	1=has telephone, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Oven	1=has oven, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Heater	1=has heater, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Computer	1=has computer, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Car	1=has car, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Electricity	1=has electricity, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Aqueduct	1=has aqueduct, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Sewage	1=has sewage, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Running water	1=has running water, 0=otherwise	Dummy
Gas	1=has car, 0=otherwise	Dummy

Appendix B Robustness Checks

B.1 Tables

B.1.1 RD Robustness Checks

Table A.5: Applicants

	Linear Half optimal bandwith	Linear Twice optimal bandwith	Linear Triangular bandwith	Linear Epanechnikov bandwith	Quadratic	Cubic	Placebo 1	Placebo 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Table 4: Modern Economy								
Wealth Index	0.199*	0.248**	0.185	0.187	0.140	0.171**	-0.231	0.412
	(0.120)	(0.113)	0.137	0.138	(0.182)	(0.0867)	(0.940)	(0.306)
Housing Index	0.261**	0.197**	0.302**	0.307*	0.337**	0.321*	0.0479	-0.370
	(0.129)	(0.100)	(0.147)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.172)	(0.159)	(0.320)
Registered for Poverty Subsidies	-0.0223	-0.174***	-0.158**	-0.202***	-0.0504	0.0101	0.0678	0.179
	(0.120)	(0.0635)	(0.0667)	(0.0611)	(0.0905)	(0.121)	(0.159)	(0.246)
Above Minimum Wages	0.0207	0.0441**	0.0302	0.0361	0.0163	0.0147	-0.0801	0.0350
	(0.0304)	(0.0213)	(0.0239)	(0.0240)	(0.0286)	(0.0291)	(0.0681)	(0.0265)
Works in Formal Sector	-0.146	0.113	0.143	0.171	0.00934	-0.0581	-0.855	0.136
	(0.242)	(0.112)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.168)	(0.191)	(0.788)	(0.147)
Agriculture	-0.0208	-0.107	-0.140*	-0.131*	-0.138	-0.151	0.239	-0.110
	(0.127)	(0.0656)	(0.0786)	(0.0740)	(0.0929)	(0.111)	(0.286)	(0.0965)
Manufacturing	-0.00345	0.0111	0.00988	0.0139	0.0107	0	0.0108	-0.00627
	(0.0259)	(0.0134)	(0.0120)	(0.0198)	(0.0133)	(0)	(0.0138)	(0.0261)
Services	-0.106	0.0903	0.139*	0.137*	0.159	0.153	-0.200	0.107
	(0.158)	(0.0705)	(0.0802)	(0.0759)	(0.0983)	(0.110)	(0.259)	(0.0960)
Table 8: Geographic Mobility								
Migration	0.0350	0.120*	0.160**	0.157**	0.182*	0.182	-0.170	0.127
	(0.130)	(0.0665)	(0.0794)	(0.0747)	(0.0976)	(0.113)	(0.286)	(0.0965)
Urban Migration	0.117*	0.135***	0.111*	0.116*	0.0940	0.0841	0.000164	0.109
	(0.0630)	(0.0436)	(0.0627)	(0.0609)	(0.0783)	(0.0957)	(0.147)	(0.0726)
Rural Migration	-0.0635	-0.0908*	-0.0934*	-0.0985*	-0.0515	-0.0304	-0.0632	-0.0660
	(0.0991)	(0.0506)	(0.0543)	(0.0529)	(0.0747)	(0.0898)	(0.120)	(0.0698)

Notes: This table documents different robustness checks for outcome in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each cell reports the coefficient from a type of RD regression, shown columns, of an outcome on *Recipient*, an indicator variable equal to 1 if an applicant was eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970, shown in rows. The unit of observation is the applicant. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Regressions also include a local linear polynomial estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Bandwidths are chosen using the MSE optimal procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2017). Source: INCORA, SISBEN, RUAF. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

Table A.6: Children of Applicants

	Linear Half optimal bandwith	Linear Twice optimal bandwith	Linear Triangular bandwith	Linear Epanechnikov bandwith	Quadratic	Cubic	Placebo 1	Placebo 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Table 5: Modern Economy								
Wealth Index	0.421***	0.238**	0.327***	0.332***	0.254	0.273	0.0741	0.206
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.0864)	(0.258)	(0.445)	(0.933)	(0.633)
Housing Index	0.410***	0.374***	0.408***	0.390***	0.357	0.527	0.284	0.160
	(0.133)	(0.102)	(0.0943)	(0.0953)	(0.291)	(0.566)	(0.625)	(0.682)
Registered for Poverty Subsidies	-0.0574	-0.198**	-0.205*	-0.228*	-0.113	-0.0178	0.412	-0.211
	(0.192)	(0.0976)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.151)	(0.178)	(0.306)	(0.305)
Above Minimum Wages	0.213	0.157**	0.186**	0.189**	0.226	0.180	0.121	0.128
	(0.139)	(0.0761)	(0.0776)	(0.0781)	(0.158)	(0.216)	(0.0921)	(0.106)
Works in Formal Sector	0.0975	0.160**	0.157***	0.175***	0.0890	-0.00570	-0.111	0.105
	(0.0820)	(0.0589)	(0.0575)	(0.0785)	(0.0968)	(0.0575)	(0.284)	(0.0788)
Agriculture	-0.0358	-0.0225	0.00218	-0.00617	-0.0178	-0.0705	0.0386	-0.0255
	(0.176)	(0.0824)	(0.0995)	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.148)	(0.374)	(0.106)
Manufacturing	0.137*	0.0601	0.0945**	0.1000**	0.0967*	0.0737	0.0625	-0.0198
	(0.0738)	(0.0469)	(0.0466)	(0.0476)	(0.0588)	(0.0648)	(0.0446)	(0.116)
Services	-0.145	-0.0762	-0.157	-0.145	-0.124	-0.0810	-0.356	-0.141
	(0.139)	(0.0856)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.169)	(0.382)	(0.139)
Table 8: Geographic Mobility								
Migration	0	0.0575	0.287***	0.293***	0.277***	0.282**	0.102	0.0193
	(0)	(0.0504)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.102)	(0.121)	(0.151)	(0.362)
Urban Migration	0	0.289***	0.282***	0.284***	0.249***	0.122	-0.0957	-0.405
	(0)	(0.103)	(0.0673)	(0.0649)	(0.0621)	(0.175)	(0.290)	(0.148)
Rural Migration	0.147	0.0921	0.130	0.129	0.198	0.243	0.0297	0.172
Table 9: Investment in Education								
	(0.183)	(0.0892)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.295)	(0.122)
Years of Schooling	1.426*	1.218*	1.890**	1.866**	0.432	0.759	0.322	0.296
	(0.843)	(0.637)	(0.940)	(0.936)	(0.725)	(0.703)	(0.246)	(0.325)
Primary School	0.234***	0.168	0.191***	0.170***	0.146	0.163	0.0699	0.0663

Notes: This table documents different robustness checks for outcome in Table 4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each cell reports the coefficient from a type of RD regression, shown columns, of an outcome on *Recipient*, an indicator variable equal to 1 if an applicant was eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970, shown in rows. The unit of observation is the children of applicants. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Regressions also include a local linear polynomial estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Bandwidths are chosen using the MSE optimal procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2017). Source: INCORA, RUAF. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

B.1.2 2SLS Estimations

Table A.7: Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	0.285*	0.426**	-0.134	0.0638	0.176	-0.223
	(0.163)	(0.209)	(0.155)	(0.0496)	(0.407)	(0.154)
Observations	283	296	324	402	324	254
Bandwidth	4.8	4.1	3.1	4.1	3.4	3.0
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.72	0.02	0.03	0.64

Notes: This table documents the long-run effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables using 2SLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an applicant was allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the applicant. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Source: INCORA, SISBEN. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

Table A.8: Children of Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	0.470**	0.548**	-0.327	-0.343*	0.352**	0.0355
	(0.236)	(0.268)	(0.198)	(0.186)	(0.166)	(0.134)
Observations	238	256	291	291	291	273
Bandwidth	4.5	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.1
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.58	0.17	0.39	0.35

Notes: This table documents the intergenerational effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables using 2SLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a child had an applicant father that was allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the children of applicants. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Source: INCORA, SISBEN. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

B.1.3 OLS Estimations

Table A.9: Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	0.14	0.217*	-0.0307	0.00302	0.0454	-0.0221
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.0540)	(0.0133)	(0.0450)	(0.0523)
R^2	0.32	0.16	0.30	0.35	0.27	0.32
Observations	728	728	975	975	975	975
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.74	0.03	0.23	0.50

Notes: This table documents the long-run effects of having received land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables using OLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an applicant was eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the applicant. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Source: INCORA, SISBEN. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

Table A.10: Children of Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	0.198***	0.259**	-0.187	0.132	0.145	-0.134
	(0.0725)	(0.107)	(0.425)	(0.333)	(0.197)	(0.0887)
R^2	0.48	0.45	0.58	0.60	0.61	0.71
Observations	638	638	991	991	991	991
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.60	0.17	0.43	0.32

Notes: This table documents the intergenerational effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables using OLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a child had an applicant father eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the applicant in Panel A and the children in Panel B. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Source: INCORA, SISBEN. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

B.1.4 Additional Checks for Geographic Mobility

Table A.11: Excluding Urban Migrants - Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	0.0739	0.222	-0.0745	0.0374	0.0655	-0.0817
	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.0945)	(0.0307)	(0.0792)	(0.106)
Observations	314	286	316	316	316	316
Bandwidth	5.2	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.3
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.80	0.03	0.15	0.63

Notes: This table documents the long-run effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables excluding from the sample urban migrants and using the baseline RD design. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an applicant was eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the applicant. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Regressions also include a local linear polynomial estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Bandwidths are chosen using the MSE optimal procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2017). Source: INCORA, RUAF. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

Table A.12: Excluding Urban Migrants - Children of Applicants

	In 2006		In 2010			
	Wealth Index	Housing Index	Register for Poverty Subsidies	Above Minimum Wage	Formal Sector	Agriculture
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Recipient	-0.0513	0.357	-0.130	0.135	-0.00125	-0.246
	(0.215)	(0.291)	(0.185)	(0.123)	(0.183)	(0.210)
Observations	302	244	358	358	358	358
Bandwidth	5.4	4.3	4.3	3.9	4.7	3.5
Mean Dep. Var.	0	0	0.65	0.17	0.28	0.45

Notes: This table documents the intergenerational effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on selected outcome variables excluding from the sample urban migrants and using the baseline RD design. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a child had an applicant father eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation is the children of applicants. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Regressions also include a local linear polynomial estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Bandwidths are chosen using the MSE optimal procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2017). Source: INCORA, RUAF. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

B.1.5 Additional Checks for Investment in Education

Table A.13: All Children

	Years of schooling	Primary school	High school	Vocational education	College
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Recipient	0.759	0.0994	-0.169	-0.0591	-0.0353
	(0.703)	(0.0887)	(0.106)	(0.0896)	(0.0592)
Observations	298	367	367	367	367
Bandwidth	4.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3
Mean Dep. Var.	5.1	0.52	0.28	0.05	0.03

Notes: This table documents the effects of providing land in 1968-1970 on investment in the education of children among all adult children using the baseline RD design. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at applicant family level are in brackets. *Recipient* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a child had an applicant father eligible to be allocated land during the agrarian reform 1968-1970. The unit of observation the children of applicant. All regressions include the following controls: age, sex, marital status, expropiation file fixed-effects. Regressions also include a local linear polynomial estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Bandwidths are chosen using the MSE optimal procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2017). The outcome data for columns (1)-(5) is SISBEN. For a description of each dependent variable see Online Appendix A Table A.3.

B.1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis

Table A.14: Cost-Benefit Analysis

Returns to Education	% Benefited	Rate of Return
(1)	(2)	(3)
10%	40%	-79.5%
10%	60%	-69.3%
10%	80%	-59.0%
15%	40%	-69.5%
15%	60%	-54.0%
15%	80%	-38.5%

Notes: This table presents different scenarios for the cost-benefit analysis. Column (1) shows different returns to education assumptions, column (2) the percentage of the children of recipients benefiting from these returns and column (3) the fiscal investment rate of return per recipient family. Source: INCORA.

B.2 Figures

B.2.1 Histograms of Distance to Predicted Score Threshold



Notes: This figure plots histograms documenting the number of observations in each cumulative predicted INCORA score bins for applicants and children. Source: INCORA.